

“WE HAVE ALMOST FORGOTTEN HOW TO HOPE”: THE HUALAPAI, THE NAVAJO, AND THE FIGHT FOR THE CENTRAL ARIZONA PROJECT, 1944–1968

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Cognizant of the larger social context of civil rights issues, supporters and opponents of the Grand Canyon dams attempted to garner Native American support during the 1960s. However, the Hualapai and Navajo exercised agency over water resources, thus complicating historians' attempts to lump American Indians into one ecologically-conscious camp.

We do not understand these so-called conservationists who love rocks and lizards more than people.

—written ostensibly by George Rocha,
Hualapai Tribal Chairman, June 1966.¹

ARIZONA'S POLITICAL, AGRICULTURAL, AND ECONOMIC interests have sought to divert water to the rich soils that lay in the central part of the state since the turn of the twentieth century. Initially, these efforts were undertaken at the local and state levels. State Senator Fred Colter conceived of perhaps the most fantastic scheme when, in the early 1920s, he created citizens advocacy groups and sponsored efforts to survey an aqueduct from the Colorado River to the Phoenix area. This “Highline Canal” measured over 500 miles in length, included 60 miles of tunnels, and featured ditches that were not only lined with concrete their entire length but were also designed to carry boat and barge traffic. Other proposals, including diversion tunnels beneath the Colorado Plateau (which ranged from seven to twelve thousand feet in height), were considered alternatives, as the state of Arizona

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¹ Chief George Rocha to Reverend Edwin Espy, 24 June 1966, Folder 5, Box 4, CAP/89, John Rhodes Papers, Special Collections, Hayden Library, Arizona State University [hereafter John Rhodes Papers].

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investigated ways to obtain what it believed was its rightful share of the Colorado River for much of the twentieth century.²

While these state-sponsored efforts were underway, Arizona's federal officials also attempted to gain congressional approval of a massive water project to be built by the federal Bureau of Reclamation. Carl Hayden led this fight in the United States Senate, and by the late 1940s he had garnered enough support to try and push the proposal known as the Central Arizona Project (CAP) through Congress. Hayden failed in his initial efforts, as California's large congressional delegation blocked the bill's passage in the House in 1950 and 1951, throwing the issue of lower Colorado River water rights into the United States Supreme Court. Although Hayden's proposal varied greatly from those sought by Arizona state officials, virtually every plan to bring Colorado River water to the central part of the state included hydroelectric dams within Grand Canyon, perhaps the best known example of the scenic grandeur of the American West and one of the seven wonders of the natural world.

During the 1960s, in the last great battle of his career, Carl Hayden found himself embroiled in another debate over the CAP, even as officials from the state of Arizona sought concurrently to obtain sources of funding for a state-constructed project. This latest fight to obtain water for central Arizona precipitated conflict on many fronts. Perhaps the best known aspect of this controversy is the battle environmentalists and water interests waged over the Grand Canyon dams, which were deleted from the federal legislation in February 1967.³ The next year Congress approved the CAP, but the enormous proposal remained a source of controversy. The Central Arizona Project remains the most expensive reclamation project ever authorized by Congress; even today it is cited by critics of federal spending as an example of pork-barrel politics at its worst. During the struggle, which lasted from 1963 to 1968, Interior Secretary Stewart Udall, Arizona senators Carl Hayden and Barry Goldwater, and representatives Morris Udall and John Rhodes, as well as environmentalists such as Sierra Club Executive Director David Brower, launched massive publicity campaigns, placed ads in national newspapers, organized conferences, and testified before Congress. Because the controversy took place during the 1960s, the formative years of the modern environmental movement, a substantial amount of literature has been devoted to the characters in this drama as well as the roles played by the Sierra Club and other environmental groups.

² Fred Colter, *The Highline Book* (Phoenix, 1934), 36–8, 44–7, available in Special Collections, University of Arizona Library, Tucson, AZ.

³ For an in-depth discussion of the Grand Canyon dam controversy see Byron E. Pearson, "People above Scenery: The Struggle over the Grand Canyon Dams, 1963–1968," (Ph.D. diss., University of Arizona, 1998). I argue in my dissertation that the deletion of the dams did not occur as a result of the environmentalists' publicity campaign but rather as a pragmatic political decision on the part of Stewart Udall and Carl Hayden. The decision to delete the dams was made at a time when a great deal of evidence suggested that congressional support for the project had not been appreciably affected by the public outcry generated by the Sierra Club.

There is, however, one aspect of this history that has received little or no publicity: the centrality of the role that American Indians played, particularly the Hualapai and Navajo Nations. An examination of the role of Native Americans during this important environmental debate over the Grand Canyon dams and Central Arizona Project is particularly intriguing, given that the peak years of the controversy occurred during the same decade that witnessed a dramatic increase in public awareness of civil rights issues and resurgent Native American nationalism. Both environmentalists and CAP proponents tried to gain the support of the Hualapai and Navajo Nations in an attempt to manipulate rising public concerns about civil rights and race relations to their advantage during this pivotal environmental debate.

Congress first began to consider the CAP and other projects for the comprehensive development of the Colorado River in 1944. During that year the Bureau of Reclamation proposed hydroelectric dams within Grand Canyon at the Bridge and Marble Canyon sites in addition to a silt control structure, the Coconino Dam, on the Little Colorado River. The south abutment of Bridge Canyon Dam, a structure that would have exceeded Hoover Dam in height, would have been located on the Hualapai Reservation, while the south abutment of the 400 foot tall Marble Canyon Dam, along with Coconino Dam and both reservoirs, would have been located on Navajo land. As these proposals evolved into the Central Arizona and Marble Canyon Projects respectively, it became readily apparent that Arizona politicians considered it a remote possibility that they would encounter American Indian opposition to construction of dams within Indian reservation boundaries, even though the dams were intended to benefit mostly Anglo farmers hundreds of miles away.

By July 1949, the Bureau had studied several townsite locations for construction workers and their families and the possibility of constructing a 2,270 foot elevator shaft to provide access from the south rim to the river for personnel and supplies at the Bridge Canyon site on the Hualapai Reservation. Reclamation personnel had also constructed a cable tramway into Marble Canyon without obtaining the permission of the Navajo tribe. After touring the construction sites on the rim and river with Reclamation officials, Grand Canyon National Park Superintendent George F. Baggeley concluded in amazement that the Bureau was pursuing its own agenda without congressional or Interior Department approval. The Bureau had also ignored the sovereignty of the Navajo and Hualapai Nations by conducting these dam-site preparations on reservation land without obtaining tribal approval.⁴

In order to understand the Bureau's ability to trespass upon two Indian reservations without appreciable repercussions, one must consider the social and political context of these events as well as the state of federal Indian policy as it existed at this time. During the late 1940s and early 1950s, the Bureau of Reclamation began preliminary studies of both dam sites at a time when Congress was attempting to end

⁴ George F. Baggeley to the Director of Region Three of the Department of the Interior, 18 July 1949, Fiche L-7423, "Dams in Colorado River 1948-1954," Grand Canyon National Park Research Library [hereafter GCNPR].

the "trust" relationship between American Indians and the federal government. Congressional proponents of this policy of termination in many cases sought to gain access to Indian resources. In the case of Bridge and Marble Canyon Dams, Bureau personnel did not believe it necessary to obtain tribal permission before initiating site preparations on Indian lands between 1947 and 1951.⁵ Although this activity came to an end with the congressional defeat of the CAP in 1951, and would remain dormant until Arizona began to push for the construction of these dams as state projects later in the decade, it stands as a striking example of the blatant disregard federal agencies held toward tribal governments and the resources they ostensibly controlled.

By 1958, however, when Arizona began to seek construction of these dams as state projects, this situation had changed considerably, much to the surprise and chagrin of Arizona state lawmakers and CAP supporters. Fueled by the Civil Rights Movement in the South, Native Americans, through the National Congress of American Indians, began to push to reassert their sovereignty within the federal constitutional framework, which considers Indian tribes to be legally enumerated as separate and independent of state governments. As Arizona's water interest groups pushed their proposals through legal and bureaucratic channels toward approval, the United States Supreme Court issued holdings beginning in 1960 that reaffirmed American Indian sovereignty, creating a body of case precedent that greatly strengthened the legal position of Native Americans in resource disputes.⁶

The phase of the Central Arizona Project debate that occurred between 1958 and 1962 involved negotiations between the tribes and the state of Arizona. It offers an opportunity to analyze the legal and power relationship between the Hualapai and Navajo Nations and the state of Arizona as it existed at the end of the Termination era and to see how this relationship shifted over the previous decade. Although Arizona possessed the legal right to seek a license to develop power sites on tribal lands in accordance with the Federal Power Acts of 1920 and 1935, these statutes also stated that Arizona could only do so if it agreed to pay an appropriate amount of compensation to Native American groups as determined by the Federal Power Commission. Consequently, in stark contrast to the situation in 1949, it appears as though the Navajo and Hualapai Nations were in a relatively favorable bargaining position as a result of increasing Native American nationalism and statutory authority.⁷

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Richard White, *"It's Your Misfortune and None of My Own": A History of the American West* (Norman, 1991), 580. The Supreme Court's reaffirmation of Indian sovereignty culminated with the 1978 decision in *United States v. Wheeler*, in which the Court held that the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment was not applicable to a case where a federal grand jury charged a Navajo male with statutory rape after he had pled guilty to the same offense under tribal law. The court ruled that the Navajo Nation constituted a sovereign entity; hence, the accused fell under the statutes of two separate jurisdictions and the Fifth Amendment did not apply.

⁷ "Federal Water Power Act," (10 June 1920), *Statutes at Large* 41 (Washington, DC, 1920), 1069; "Federal Power Act," (26 August 1935), *Statutes at Large* 49 (Washington, DC, 1936), 838-41.

Lawyers for the state of Arizona entered into negotiations with the Hualapai and Navajo Nations in 1958, which, having learned from their past experiences with the Bureau, had retained eminent legal counsel to negotiate on their behalf. The attorneys from each side confronted a bewildering morass of legal issues and conflicting statutes. In the case of the Hualapai, the Federal Power Acts appeared to support Arizona's assertion that the state should be allowed to construct Bridge Canyon Dam if it agreed to make a nominal payment. However, attorneys Arthur Lazarus and Royal Marks asserted that the constitution the Hualapai had adopted in accordance with the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 granted the tribe sovereign rights over all of its territory, negating the effect of these statutes. Negotiations dragged on for over a year, after which Arizona's counsel reluctantly concluded that the Hualapai stood in a strong legal position. As a result, Arizona agreed to grant the Hualapai a contract promising annual payments that would vary between \$550,000 and \$620,000 for the life of the project, an estimated 40 to 50 years. On 30 August 1960, representatives from the state of Arizona and the Hualapai Nation signed the contract, eliminating the possibility that Native American concerns would threaten the construction of Bridge Canyon Dam as a state project.⁸

Arizona also negotiated with attorneys from the Navajo Nation over the rights to the Marble Canyon Dam site, and the legal muddle in this case was even more confusing than that in the Hualapai situation. The Navajo Reservation had been created by an 1868 treaty and expanded subsequently by a series of congressional acts and presidential proclamations. The Navajo had defied the efforts of BIA Commissioner John Collier during the 1930s, refusing to adopt a constitution under the provisions of the Indian Reorganization Act. Congress had granted Arizona a five-year window, beginning with its admission to the Union in 1912, during which the state had the right to reserve power sites along the Colorado River for future utilization. In accordance with the State Enabling Act, Arizona filed a power withdrawal on the Marble Canyon site prior to the 1917 deadline, even though the site was located at that time within the Tusayan National Forest.⁹ In 1930, Congress transferred parts of the Tusayan National Forest, including the dam site, to the Navajo tribe, while preserving "all valid rights and claims of individuals initiated prior to approval of the Act." In 1934, Congress

⁸ W. S. Gookin to Morris Udall, 22 March 1965, and "Hualapai Contract," executed 30 August 1960, both in Folder 4, Box 8, Carl Hayden Papers, Special Collections, Hayden Library, Arizona State University [hereafter Carl Hayden Papers].

⁹ This withdrawal was actually filed on E. C. La Rue's Redwall site from his 1923 survey of the Colorado River. However, since the Bureau proposed to construct Marble Canyon Dam here in its 1946 report, the name, Marble Canyon, became associated with this location. In Bureau and other hydrological studies after 1946, the site is referred to as "the Marble Canyon site," and so to alleviate confusion I have referred to it as such throughout this narrative, even though the original Marble Canyon site was located further upstream. See E. C. La Rue, *Water Power and Flood Control of Colorado River Below Green River, Utah*, Water Supply Paper 556 (Washington, DC, 1925), 134-9.

enlarged the reservation further but specifically preserved Arizona's power site withdrawals and nullified the provisions of the Federal Power Act that would have given the Navajo Nation a claim against the state. Consequently, in 1960 Arizona stood in a strong legal position because Congress had granted it the right to utilize this reach of the Colorado River for hydroelectric projects and the state had filed power withdrawals in a timely manner.¹⁰

Based upon this statutory authority, attorneys for Arizona did not offer a contract to the Navajo Nation because they believed that the tribe did not have any legal rights to the Marble Canyon Dam site. In September 1962, after several years of haggling between attorneys from Arizona and California, the Federal Power Commission agreed and awarded Arizona a license to construct a hydroelectric dam at the Marble Canyon site. Commissioner Edwin Marsh affirmed Arizona's arguments and denied the Navajo claims of compensation, ruling that the site belonged to the state of Arizona and was not a part of the Navajo Reservation.¹¹

Not only could the Navajo do nothing to prevent state construction of Marble Canyon Dam, Commissioner Marsh also ruled that the tribe was not even entitled to revenue from the power it would produce. Arizona had seemingly triumphed and began project preparations. However, the issue of Native American compensation was not settled. Proponents of a state-constructed project failed to consider that in the winter of 1962 powerful Arizona politicians who favored a federal project, Senator Carl Hayden and Representative Morris Udall among them, were eagerly awaiting the ruling of the Supreme Court in *Arizona v. California*. In the event that the anticipated holding favored Arizona, Hayden and Udall planned to negate any state action by reviving congressional consideration of a federally-constructed CAP, the proposal that Congress had defeated in 1949 and 1950.¹²

¹⁰ "Arizona Enabling Act," (20 June 1910), *Statutes at Large* 36 (Washington, DC, 1911), 575; "Navajo Indian Reservation Extension Act," (14 June 1934), *Statutes at Large* 48 (Washington, DC, 1934), 960; Decision Upon Application For License Under Section 4(e) Of The Federal Power Act: Arizona Power Authority, Project No. 2248, United States Federal Power Commission, issued 10 September 1962, 12-5, Folder 1, Box 321, Carl Hayden Papers. For a general discussion of the Indian Reorganization Act, and the effects of its implementation, see Alvin M. Josephy, Jr., "Modern America and the Indians," in *Indians in American History: An Introduction*, ed. Frederick E. Hoxie (Arlington Heights, IL, 1988), 254-9. A legal ambiguity existed over whether the state of Arizona possessed rights to the site, because the language of the Tusayan transfer only specified that "individuals" would retain their power withdrawals.

¹¹ Decision, United States Federal Power Commission, issued 10 September 1962, 14-5, Folder 1, Box 321, Carl Hayden Papers. It appears the tribunal did not consider the ambiguity in the language of the 1930 transfer of parts of the Tusayan National Forest to the Navajo Nation. The statute preserves the power withdrawals of "individuals" along the river. However, even though corporate entities are legal persons, the same does not hold true for state and federal governmental agencies. Thus it is questionable whether the state of Arizona met the legal definition of "individual," which was the key provision used by Marsh in denying Navajo claims to the site.

¹² See Rich Johnson, *The Central Arizona Project, 1918-1968* (Tucson, 1977), 87-124 for a detailed account of the *Arizona v. California* saga.

Navajo officials also anxiously awaited the Court's decision because the revival of a federal project would create a new forum in which they could reiterate their demands for compensation for the Marble Canyon Dam site. Meanwhile Arizona state officials, having antagonized the largest Native American group in America at a time of increasing public concerns over civil rights issues, would soon view the favorable holding from the Federal Power Commission as a Pyrrhic victory. At the same time the Navajo Nation entered the national debate over the Grand Canyon dams. Indeed Navajo officials had anticipated that the Federal Power Commission would rule against them and had initiated a campaign to obtain federal construction of Marble Canyon Dam the previous year. In May 1961 the Navajo Tribal Council passed a resolution opposing Arizona's license application for the dam. Attorneys for the Navajo argued that Arizona's claim of a superior legal position was dubious and the Navajo people should be entitled to compensation on the same scale as the Hualapai, including payment for the site itself, an annual stream of revenue similar to that given the Hualapai, and a preferential position as a power user which would allow the Navajo Nation to purchase electricity at greatly reduced rates. Accordingly, Tribal Chairman Paul Jones began to pressure Morris Udall to seek a federal project in the fall of 1961.¹³

The Navajo resolution placed Morris Udall in a most uncomfortable situation because two separate elements of his constituency now directly opposed each other over water, arguably his state's most sensitive political concern. The fact that his brother Stewart now held the position of Interior Secretary only complicated matters because Stewart opposed the state proposal and thus incurred the wrath of Arizona water interests, including the powerful Phoenix newspapers.¹⁴ For Morris to introduce a bill on behalf of the Navajo Nation would bring accusations from Arizona state officials that he was in agreement with the Interior Department's position. Ironically, although Arizona's populace had benefitted greatly from federal reclamation and other programs, it had elected the outspoken Barry Goldwater to the Senate because of his opposition to federal largess and his support of states' rights. For Morris Udall as a freshman congressman to take the Navajo Nation's position against state water interests would have been difficult; to be accused of doing so in support of the Interior Department position probably would have been fatal to his career, for the state proposal was highly popular with the public. Yet Udall represented both groups, so he began to communicate with his House colleagues about the possibility of having someone else sponsor the Navajo bill.¹⁵

¹³ *Arizona Republic*, 3 May 1961, 22, and *Arizona Daily Star*, 3 May 1961. See also "Resolution of the Navajo Tribal Council: Urging Construction of Marble Canyon Dam as a Bureau of Reclamation Project," 22 May 1961, and Paul Jones to Morris Udall, 19 October 1961, both in File 7, Box 477, Morris Udall Papers, Special Collections, University of Arizona [hereafter Morris Udall Papers].

¹⁴ The Phoenix newspapers, the *Arizona Republic* and *Phoenix Gazette*, maintained an antagonistic attitude toward Stewart Udall for virtually his entire term as Interior Secretary. For one of many examples see *Arizona Republic*, 16 July 1963, 6.

¹⁵ Morris Udall to Wayne Aspinall, 16 October 1961, Folder 7, Box 477, Morris Udall Papers.

The momentum swung decisively in favor of a federally-constructed Central Arizona Project in the summer of 1963, when the U.S. Supreme Court handed down its decision in *Arizona v. California*, awarding Arizona a substantial share of the lower Colorado River.¹⁶ Arizona politicians began once again to push for the construction of the CAP as a federal project. Arizona's American Indian groups viewed this development from opposing perspectives: although a federal project gave the Navajo new hope of compensation, it negated the recent gains made by the Hualapai because the state's Federal Power Commission license had now been abrogated, along with the lucrative contract the Hualapai had executed with the state of Arizona in 1960. Meanwhile, the Bureau of Reclamation took advantage of the situation and in an amazing display of hubris, continued its site preparations without the permission of either tribe.¹⁷

As Morris Udall sought to represent the interests of his divided constituency, his brother Stewart attempted to gain the backing of officials within the Interior Department for a grand scheme designed to garner the support of California congressmen in the House of Representatives, an obstacle that Arizona had not been able to overcome during the CAP debates of 1949–1951. During his years in Congress, Stewart Udall had participated in the highly publicized debate over the construction of dams in Dinosaur National Monument in the mid-1950s, which resulted in a victory for the Sierra Club and other environmentalists. Udall experienced firsthand the emerging political power and public appeal of the environmental movement, and he was aware of the threat it might pose to the Central Arizona Project. Choosing between these two possible antagonists, the Secretary decided that California's backing was indispensable for congressional approval. Udall included the CAP within the Pacific Southwest Water Plan in 1963, a proposal of unprecedented scope that secured California's support with the promise of water importation from the Columbia River. The most important aspect of this breathtaking proposal was the construction of a high Bridge Canyon Dam to generate power and revenue for the project, especially its Columbia River diversion. The scheme also included a power dam at the Marble Canyon site.¹⁸ Although the high Bridge Canyon Dam secured California's support, it guaranteed the opposition of environmentalists, who though relatively disorganized were already mounting a publicity campaign to stop the construction of the dams because of the threats they posed to Grand Canyon National Park and Monument.

As if potential conflict with environmentalists was not enough, officials within the Interior Department began to warn Udall of a new danger—the threat that

¹⁶ *Arizona v. California* can be found in *United States Reports* 376 (Washington, DC, 1964), 340–53.

¹⁷ These site preparations were widely reported in Arizona's newspapers. For an example see *Flagstaff Daily Sun*, 15 August 1963, 1.

¹⁸ *Arizona Republic*, 27 December 1963, 1; *Arizona Republic*, 29 December 1963, 1; *New York Times*, 16 February 1964, 64. See also Stewart Udall interview by author, 13 March 1997, in author's possession.

environmentalists might ally themselves with Native Americans against the plan. Assistant Secretary of the Interior John Carver wrote Udall and urged him to consider the political ramifications of the high dam. Noting that the environmentalists were still angry over controversies involving Glen Canyon and Rainbow Bridge National Monument, Carver contended that the environmentalists would “mount the most vigorous and concerted campaign since Hetch Hetchy” to defeat the high Bridge Canyon Dam. Carver also pointed out that the proposal neglected to consider the position of the Native American tribes that would be affected: sixty thousand acres of Hualapai and Navajo Reservation land would be flooded, and the Havasupai stood to lose a mile of the spectacular canyon they had lived in for hundreds of years. Carver argued in practical terms, putting the aesthetic and conservation factors aside; he believed that the Secretary risked defeat if environmentalists and American Indians united against the dams. And such adamant opposition would not arise if Bridge Canyon Dam were built just 100 feet lower because a low dam would not infringe upon the park. However, Udall believed California’s support hinged upon retaining the high dam, so he instructed his subordinates to initiate negotiations with the Navajo and Hualapai Nations in an attempt to prevent them from throwing in with the environmentalists in what was rapidly becoming a national controversy.¹⁹

These negotiations with tribal officials, begun behind the scenes in 1965, must be read in light of the larger social context of the 1960s, in particular, growing public concerns over civil rights and environmental issues. By 1965 the Sierra Club and other groups had mobilized against the Grand Canyon dams, and Carver’s warning was borne home to the Udall brothers and Senator Hayden during the 1965 House Interior Committee hearings in which Hualapai Chief George Rocha and tribal counsel Royal Marks testified that if the federal government balked at compensation, the Hualapai would obtain financial backing and build the dam on their own.²⁰ Rocha argued that although he favored the construction of the dam because of the economic benefits that would accrue to his people, the present CAP proposals contained no provision for compensating the tribe for the 20,132 acres of reservation land the project would require. Citing the contract of 1960, Rocha contended that the federal government should at least match what the state of Arizona had agreed to pay to construct a lower dam that would have flooded a much smaller portion of the Hualapai Reservation.²¹

¹⁹ Assistant Secretary—Public Land Management to Secretary of the Interior, 6 January 1964, Part 1, Box 125, Department of the Interior, Central Classified Files, Record Group 48, National Archives, College Park, Maryland [hereafter In/CCF, RG 48]. Since the Havasupai did not play an active role in the controversy and because neither dam would have been located on their land, I have not included them in this discussion.

²⁰ House, Subcommittee on Irrigation and Reclamation of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, *Lower Colorado Basin Project: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Irrigation and Reclamation of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs*, 89 Cong., 1st sess., 23–31 August, 1 September 1965, 645–53. A bound copy is available in Box 490 of the Morris Udall Papers.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 646–53.

Additionally, Chief Rocha revealed that his people would demand money up front to avoid problems like those encountered by the Sioux and Seneca tribes when they sought compensation from Congress after losing parts of their reservations to reservoirs, and he insisted that the dam be renamed "Hualapai" no matter who constructed it. If the Hualapai Nation developed the site, Marks argued, it proposed to build a low dam in accordance with Federal Power Commission guidelines; hence by law, the dam would be constructed so that it would not back water into the national park or monument.²² For the chief of the Hualapai tribe to testify that Congress and the Interior Department had virtually ignored the rights of Native Americans was a potentially devastating development, but perhaps even worse from a dam supporter's perspective was the possibility that the tribe's position might appeal to many environmentalists. If the Hualapai built the dam on their own, Grand Canyon National Park and Monument would be completely out of danger.²³

Arizona officials embarked hurriedly upon a program of damage control. Morris Udall was furious, particularly with Marks, who, Udall believed, had "bragged" to the committee that the Hualapai could construct the dam on their own. But the wily Udall also saw in the Hualapai testimony a potential solution that might save the high Bridge Canyon Dam and the political alliance between Arizona and California that depended upon it. Udall believed that the Native American position could be used to not only gain a public-relations windfall for the CAP from people concerned with American Indian issues, but, depending upon circumstances, it might be possible to paint the Sierra Club and other CAP opponents as anti-Indian during a time of heightened public sensitivity to racial issues, a potential public-relations nightmare for environmentalists.²⁴

Advocates of the Central Arizona Project now moved to strengthen their position against the environmentalists, and they launched a preemptive strike in fall 1965 to prevent the alliance of environmentalists and the Hualapai. The "Indian problem," as some Arizona officials had begun to call it, could no longer be ignored in the face of the explosive civil rights issues involved.²⁵ Morris Udall asked the Bureau of Reclamation to assess the impact that the Hualapai contract of 1960 would have, and the analysis revealed that the annual payments would reduce the project's revenue pool by

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid. In order for the Hualapai Nation to construct the dam it would first have to gain a license from the Federal Power Commission. Without obtaining authorization from Congress, a most unlikely possibility, the Commission could only approve a low dam that would not infringe upon Grand Canyon National Park or Monument.

²⁴ Udall to Dominy, 28 August 1965, Folder 5, Box 477, Morris Udall Papers; and Morris Udall to Stewart Udall, 20 January 1966, Folder 6, Box 166, Stewart Udall Papers, Special Collections, University of Arizona [hereafter Stewart Udall Papers].

²⁵ Douglas Wall, Chairman, Arizona Interstate Stream Commission, "Confidential Memorandum," forwarded to John Rhodes by Ray Killian, Secretary, Arizona Interstate Stream Commission, 8 March 1965, Folder 1, Box 2, CAP/88, John Rhodes Papers.

almost \$93 million by the year 2047. Attorneys for the Hualapai Nation confirmed that at a minimum the tribe expected the Interior Department to compensate it at the rate to which the state of Arizona had agreed back in 1960, when it was seeking to construct a low dam, and its demands would probably increase because the federal plan called for a high dam. In addition to the large annual payments, the Hualapai also expected to purchase power at the lowest market rate, to control the revenue generated by tourists using the south shore of the reservoir, to have a road constructed to the reservoir for recreational purposes, and to change the name of the dam from Bridge Canyon to Hualapai.²⁶

Arizona's water officials debated how best to approach the sensitive issue of negotiations with the Hualapai Nation. Rich Johnson, President of the Central Arizona Project Association (CAPA), a CAP lobbying group, wrote Morris Udall in December and expressed the opinion that any and all Indian claims should be taken to the Interior Department directly. Johnson believed CAPA should not get involved because it was a state organization, and if the state of Arizona opposed the Hualapai claims, it would become a public relations disaster. He believed such a sensitive issue should be left to the federal government. Morris Udall and Arizona Representative John Rhodes met with Marks in early January 1966 to try to get the tribe to budge on some of its demands, but Marks was adamant, giving the Arizona representatives a thinly-veiled ultimatum. Morris Udall wrote his brother shortly after this encounter, and Stewart issued an immediate directive to his staff to get moving on a solution. Morris Udall, who was spearheading the effort, found himself confronted with an uncomfortable choice, for to give in to the Hualapai demands would result in a great depletion of the revenue pool that was designed to finance the importation of water from the Pacific Northwest, the key provision that had attained the support of California and House Interior Committee Chairman Wayne Aspinall from Colorado. Additionally, it would also increase the importance of the high Bridge Canyon Dam even more, leaving little room for compromise with the environmentalists. Udall, however, also recognized that he had little alternative because he believed if CAP proponents failed to placate the tribe, it would imperil the entire project.²⁷

Virtually everyone concerned with the passage of the Central Arizona Project, from the Interior Secretary to Arizona's federal politicians and state water advocates,

²⁶ Acting Commissioner of Reclamation to Morris Udall, 12 October 1965, Folder 5, Box 477, Morris Udall Papers. The terms of the Hualapai contract with the APA, adjusted for inflation between 1960 and 1965, called for a payment of \$150,000 upon execution of the agreement; \$2000/month; a lump sum payment of between \$1.05 and \$1.37 million; and annual royalties of between \$402,000 and \$794,400 for the life of the project. Please see "Statement of Arthur Lazarus: Re Interest of Hualapai Tribe In CAP," attached to Udall to Rhodes and Senner, 18 May 1965, Folder 5, Box 477, Morris Udall Papers.

²⁷ Johnson to Morris Udall, 25 December 1965; Marks to Rhodes, Udall, and Senner, 17 January 1966; Morris Udall to Stewart Udall, 20 January 1966, all in Folder 5, Box 477, Morris Udall Papers.

recognized the importance of avoiding a conflict with the Hualapai Nation. Spurred on by Secretary Udall to find a solution, Interior Department staff proposed their recommendations. Harry Anderson, the Assistant Secretary for Public Land Management, argued that the Department of the Interior should agree to the Hualapai demands as a matter of "public policy" and "equity." He also contended that the Indians stood in danger of being "exploited nationally" by the environmentalists if supporters of the CAP failed to gain their support. Les Alexander of the Arizona Interstate Stream Commission put the situation more bluntly in a conversation with Congressman John Rhodes: the price of giving in to the Hualapai demands must be the tribe's support of the project. If this could be achieved, it presented the opportunity to turn the Hualapai desire to have Bridge Canyon/Hualapai Dam into a public-relations disaster for the Sierra Club and other environmentalists. Alexander urged the hiring of a professional advertising agency to mount "a professional type rebuttal" against the environmentalists, arguing that "the plight of the poor Hualapais would be one fine avenue for bringing national pressure to bear for the construction of Bridge Canyon."²⁸ Clearly, Alexander, John Rhodes, and other Arizona water advocates believed that it might be possible to portray the Sierra Club and other environmentalists opposed to the CAP as racist and gain a tremendous public windfall from people sympathetic to racial and civil rights issues.

Meanwhile environmentalists, unaware of the pro-dam lobby's attempts to gain the backing of Native Americans, sought a national forum through the media in which to communicate the threat to Grand Canyon. In March 1966 they held a symposium at the rim of Grand Canyon itself. During a tumultuous two-day meeting that was crashed by uninvited CAP supporters such as Barry Goldwater and Morris Udall, David Brower and other environmentalists made their anti-dam case to the nation. During the debate Goldwater emphasized that Bridge Canyon Dam would bring tremendous economic benefits to the Hualapai Nation. Goldwater's comment piqued the interest of Stephen Jett, a young professor of geography at the University of California, Davis (and unaffiliated with any conservation organization), who had recently written his dissertation about the Navajo people. Jett, taking advantage of the confusion, managed to pose as a member of the press and asked Goldwater whether the proposal would confer benefits upon the Navajo. Goldwater replied that to the best of his knowledge, the Navajo Indians possessed no legal rights in the site, and consequently, they had "not been consulted," a comment that struck Jett as "unjust." Amazed by this exchange, David Brower asked Jett to testify in behalf of the Navajo people at the upcoming CAP congressional hearings scheduled for May 1966.²⁹

²⁸ Assistant Secretary—Public Land Management to Secretary Udall, 14 March 1966, Folder 6, Box 169; and Les Alexander, "Memo to the files," 30 March 1966, Folder 1, Box 169, Stewart Udall Papers.

²⁹ Stephen Jett to author, 6 February 1998, in author's possession; see also Brower to Kellogg, 28 April 1966, Folder 16, Box 22, Sierra Club Members' Papers, Bancroft Library, University of California Berkeley [hereafter SCMP].

The publicity machines of both sides shifted into high gear as the controversial dams came again before Congress. Hualapai Chief Rocha testified once again, but this time as a supporter of the high dam. Wayne Aspinall, the powerful Interior Committee Chair, stressed the importance of having Rocha testify in late April when he told Morris Udall that he believed it would be a good strategic move to “have an Indian, preferably the Chief of the Hualapai Tribe . . . testify . . . in support of the bill” because he wanted to “put those who opposed Bridge Canyon Dam in the position of being anti-Indian.” Rocha indeed confirmed the CAP backers’ hopes, testifying that the dam constituted his people’s only hope for economic salvation and stressed that without it they would continue to live in poverty.³⁰

Environmentalists anticipated that the pro-dam lobby might try such a move, and they attempted to enlist the aid of a prominent anthropologist, Henry Dobyns, a professor from Cornell and a leading authority on the Hualapai tribe who had done extensive archeological assessments and excavations in lower Grand Canyon. However, this move backfired. Eugene Weiner of the Colorado Open Space Coordinating Council wrote Dobyns shortly after the Grand Canyon symposium and asked the anthropologist if he would be willing to testify against the dams at the upcoming hearings. Dobyns replied that he would not oppose the dams, but he in fact would be “very happy to testify . . . in favor” of Bridge Canyon Dam because it offered economic opportunity for the Hualapai tribe and would help them to become integrated into the “United States’ body politic.” Blasting the environmentalists’ campaign, Dobyns accused them of racial discrimination and of attempting to hold the Hualapai tribe in “economic, social, and political subordination.”³¹

Many dam supporters now believed Dobyns and the Hualapai Nation were the perfect solution to the environmentalists’ anti-dam offensive. The Phoenix newspapers soon published Dobyns’s remarks, and Morris Udall gleefully referenced Dobyns’s letter to Weiner during a speech on the floor of the House of Representatives entitled “The Conservationist Plot That Failed” and inserted the letter into the *Congressional Record*. Dobyns himself testified before the House Committee on 13 May, arguing that the approval of the dam would allow the Hualapai to join “the Great Society.” Addressing the Sierra Club leadership directly, Dobyns stated that he hoped his “fellow liberals” would “see the wisdom of the conservation of Indians as well as rocks and ducks.”³²

³⁰ Morris Udall to Les Alexander, 26 April 1966, Folder 2, Box 476, Morris Udall Papers; and John Rhodes, “Memorandum,” 18 April 1966, Folder 4, Box 3, CAP/89, John Rhodes Papers; see also House, Subcommittee on Irrigation and Reclamation of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, *Lower Colorado Basin Project: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Irrigation and Reclamation of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs*, 89th Cong., 2d sess., 9–13, 18 May 1966, 1294. A bound copy is available in Box 490, Morris Udall Papers.

³¹ Eugene Weiner to Henry Dobyns, 2 April 1966; and Dobyns to Weiner, 6 April 1966, Folder 4, Box 3, CAP/89, John Rhodes Papers.

³² *Lower Colorado Basin Project Hearings*, 1577, 1579; Ray Killian to Rich Johnson, 18 April 1966; John Rhodes to Henry Dobyns, 20 April 1966, Folder 4, Box 3, CAP/89, John Rhodes

Failing in their attempt to negate Hualapai support for Bridge Canyon Dam, the environmentalists now turned to the Navajo Nation. As Barry Goldwater revealed at the Grand Canyon symposium in April, the Interior Department refused to recognize Navajo claims to the Marble Canyon site. Sensing an opportunity, Stephen Jett, who had extracted this information from Goldwater, appeared to testify at the May hearings. Although he met with David Brower and other leaders of the environmentalists' effort prior to the hearings, Jett testified as a private individual because he believed, based upon his own doctoral research, that the "interests of the tribe should be represented." Though his testimony lacked the official blessing of the Navajo Tribal Council, he argued that it was only because the Council had just learned of the hearings and did not have time to prepare a response. Jett assured the committee that he had the approval of the tribal chairman, who was very concerned about the proposed inundation of the scenic beauty of Marble Canyon, and he inserted a detailed statement into the record which pointed out that the federal government had failed to consult with the tribe on the proposed legislation. Jett cited projections indicating that the demand for "scenic tourism" would increase exponentially over that for water-based recreation during the next four decades, and, in anticipation of that, the tribe wished to develop tourist access to overlooks along the "Navajo Rim" of the gorge. Alternative sources of power would also create economic opportunities for the poverty-stricken Navajo people because the reservation contained vast, undeveloped deposits of coal and uranium. Jett maneuvered so that he could testify after Doby's so he might have a chance to rebut him, and he entered a statement demonstrating how the Hualapai people would also benefit from scenic tourism if tribal parks were developed in lower Grand Canyon.³³

By the summer of 1966, proponents of the Grand Canyon dams and environmentalists alike had attempted to gain approval of the Native Americans in the region. By ignoring the Navajo Nation, however, CAP supporters made a colossal blunder. Between 1957 and 1962, proponents of a state-constructed Marble Canyon Dam had antagonized the 100,000 members of the Navajo Nation by failing to include them as beneficiaries to the project, a position reflected in the Navajo's 1961 resolution calling for federal construction. Neither had Stewart Udall's Pacific Southwest Water Plan nor other federal CAP proposals offered compensation to the Navajo for the dam site. Yet, beginning in 1965, these same federal proposals included enormous revenue streams for the Hualapai Nation, whose total population numbered just over nine hundred people.

As a result, the CAP lobby missed a tremendous opportunity to do exactly as Colorado Congressman and House Interior Committee Chairman Wayne Aspinall

Papers; "Dam Foes Fail to Get Doby's Aid," *Arizona Republic*, 8 May 1966; Morris K. Udall, "The Conservationist Plot That Failed," *Congressional Record* 112 (10 May 1966), A2507-8.

³³ *Lower Colorado Basin Project Hearings*, 1581-7; Stephen Jett to author, 28 December 1997 and 6 February 1998, in author's possession.

had proposed—to make the environmentalists appear as though they were anti-Indian—because proponents of the dams themselves had antagonized the Navajo tribe. Through the dam lobby's negligence and Stephen Jett's testimony, the environmentalists now possessed the ability to negate Aspinall's strategy. Although supporters of the Central Arizona Project had also gained the approval of several other Arizona Native American groups, including the White Mountain Apache, San Carlos, and Pima Nations, and could argue truthfully that most Arizona tribes approved of the project, the environmentalists could counter by pointing out that most Arizona Indians opposed it because the Navajo Nation, the largest Indian group in the United States, far outnumbered the combined population of the rest of Arizona's Native Americans.

Nevertheless, Morris Udall, Aspinall, and other CAP supporters increased their efforts to paint environmentalists as racist with a stepped-up and somewhat devious public-relations campaign. Arizona's CAP task force decided to send an avalanche of letters from the Hualapai Chairman, and other Arizona and Colorado tribes, to Congress, President Johnson, the National Council of Churches, Secretary Udall, and 12,000 "Indian friends," emphasizing that the dam would enable them to cast off their bonds of poverty. A special letter "to be released to the press," was to be sent from Chief George Rocha to David Brower in a move designed to taint the Sierra Club Executive Secretary personally. However, Rocha was not entrusted with the actual writing of these letters; that task was delegated to Central Arizona Project Association President Rich Johnson. All the chief was asked to contribute was his signature, along with some Hualapai Tribal Council letterhead.³⁴

Johnson, the high powered Phoenix water attorney and sophisticated lobbyist, ghostwrote this excerpt from a letter, signed by Chief Rocha, as a plea for support from selected "Indian friends":

My people have lived in isolation and poverty for so long that we have almost forgotten how to hope for a better way. The progress and prosperity of the nation have not touched our lives. Our world is the canyon country of the Colorado River in Arizona. There are no jobs for us. We have no businesses to run and no resources to sell, but now there is a new hope for us. I will tell you about it because we need your help to make the dreams of our people come true. . . . [Hualapai Dam] will make jobs and businesses for us and we will not be a poor and forgotten people any longer.

Johnson also wrote similar letters that were signed by the chiefs of the San Carlos, Pima, and White Mountain Apache Nations, while Felix Sparks of the Upper Colo-

³⁴ L. M. Alexander, "Memorandum—A Lobbying Plan," 8 June 1966, and L. M. Alexander, "Subject: A Lobbying Plan (Ref. June 8, 1966 Memo)," 6 July 1966, Folder 5, Box 477, Morris Udall Papers. These two memos confirm that Johnson and Sparks were assigned the task of writing the letters and in fact completed it.

rado River Commission played a similar role and wrote letters signed by the chiefs of the Southern Ute and Ute Mountain tribes.³⁵

This strategy on the part of the CAP lobby demonstrates that they understood the larger social context in which the controversy was taking place, and they believed that they could succeed in turning current civil rights concerns in their favor by portraying opponents of the dams as selfish elitists, who not only desired to keep most ordinary Americans out of lower Grand Canyon but also sought to deny the rightful owners of the Hualapai Dam site the right to profit from their own resource. This strategy had real potential to negate the gains made by the environmentalists in the court of public opinion. In July 1966, at the height of the fight over the dams, Rich Johnson's letters, ostensibly signed by Hualapai Chief Rocha and other Native Americans, began arriving in the offices of congressmen, newspaper editors, and other intended recipients. One was promptly read aloud on the House floor and inserted into the *Congressional Record*, while western newspapers began running articles with quotes "written" by Chief Rocha, arguing that the Hualapai Dam would confer great benefits upon the tribe.³⁶

But environmentalists managed to rebut this racist portrayal by mobilizing the Navajo Nation to take a public stand against the dams. Stephen Jett, who by this time was actively working in behalf of the Sierra Club, attended a critical Navajo Tribal Council meeting at Window Rock, Arizona. When the Navajo Council met on 1 August 1966, Tribal Attorney Norman Littell drafted a resolution in opposition to the dams, calling instead for the development of the reservation's vast deposits of coal. On 3 August, the council overwhelmingly approved a measure condemning the Grand Canyon dams and the "tactics of the Udalls" and approved a contract with Peabody Coal Company to develop the reservation's coal resources as an alternative energy source. Presidential Medal of Freedom recipient Annie Wauneka assisted in the preparation of a press release outlining the Navajo's condemnation of the dams, and the national press picked up the story, a tremendous blow to the pro-dam lobby's attempt to appeal to the American public by portraying opponents of the dams as prejudiced against Native Americans.³⁷

³⁵ George Rocha to "Friend," n.d., Folder 5, Box 4, CAP/89, John Rhodes Papers; L. M. Alexander, "Memorandum—A Lobbying Plan," 8 June 1966; L. M. Alexander, "Subject: A Lobbying Plan (Ref. June 8, 1966 Memo)," 6 July 1966, Folder 5, Box 477, Morris Udall Papers. Though the Rocha letter is undated, comparable letters to Brower, President Johnson, the National Council of Churches, and all congressmen were sent on 24 June 1966, and the memoranda cited above, confirm that the letter to "Indian friends" was, in fact, sent.

³⁶ George F. Senner, Jr., "Letter from White Mountain Apache Tribe," *Congressional Record* (2 August 1966), A-4075; *Arizona Republic*, 16 July 1966; "Conservationists out to Halt Big Water Project," *Riverside Daily Enterprise*, 20 July 1966.

³⁷ Jett to author, 28 December 1997; Stephen Jett, "Navajos Enter Fight Against Grand Canyon Dams," August 1966, 1–10, copy in author's possession; *Gallup (NM) Independent*, 4 August 1966; Orren Beatty, "Notes to SLU," 5 September 1966, Folder 1, Box 127, Stewart Udall Papers; T. W. Taylor, BIA Acting Commissioner to Secretary Udall, 5 August 1966, Folder 1, Box 127, Stewart Udall Papers.

In autumn 1966 it became apparent to Interior Secretary Udall that the dams could not be included in the bill for politically pragmatic reasons, and he asked Interior Department officials to begin to explore alternatives to the Grand Canyon dams. The public first became aware of this new Interior Department position in February 1967 when Udall proposed new legislation that deleted the dams in favor of coal-fired power plants. Ironically, although Arizona's politicians, including Udall's own brother Morris, still lobbied in favor of the Grand Canyon dams, the Interior Department threw its weight behind the Sierra Club arguments of the previous summer and extolled the benefits that would accrue to the Navajo Nation if coal plants were substituted to generate power for the CAP.³⁸ Meanwhile, Hualapai Chief Rocha testified once again before the House Interior Committee in the spring of 1967, but only at the behest of Arizona water officials, who now found themselves opposed by environmentalists and the Interior Department. In spring 1968, the Hualapai lost even this source of support as Arizona politicians abandoned the dams in favor of the proposal that Congress would eventually pass that October—a CAP powered by coal-fired power plants located on the Navajo Reservation, fueled by the output of Peabody Coal's mines, also located on Navajo land. With nowhere else to turn, the Hualapai Nation held hearings in the early 1970s, seeking to construct a low dam on its own, but this effort was preempted when Congress enlarged Grand Canyon National Park in 1975.³⁹

So what conclusions can we draw from this case study regarding the legal agency and standing of American Indian groups, Native American nationalism, and struggles over resources claimed by state, federal, and American Indian interests? First, that in the case of the debate over the Central Arizona Project, Native Americans began to make significant progress in the immediate post-Termination era in their relationships with state governments. Although tribal and state governments are recognized as separate sovereign entities within the federal constitutional framework and by case law dating back to the 1830s, the reality is that for much of the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century, state governments and federal agencies generally imposed their will upon tribal governments. In the case of dam and reservoir construction this blatant disregard for Native American concerns was perhaps best (or worst) exemplified in the mid-to-late 1950s, when the Bureau of Reclamation and Army Corps of Engineers constructed the massive Pick-Sloan Project, which inundated hundreds of thousands of acres of Sioux land in North and South Dakota, while in the state of New

³⁸ Stewart Udall, interview with author, 17 March 1996.

³⁹ *Official Report of Proceedings before the United States Department of the Interior National Park Service, in the Matter of Public Hearings of the Wilderness Proposal for Grand Canyon National Park*, 18 May 1971, GCA 32099, Grand Canyon National Park Museum Collection. I recognize that American Indian source materials would have added additional perspectives to this discussion, but I was unable to gain access to Hualapai and Navajo tribal records, nor would former Hualapai attorney Arthur Lazarus consent to an interview or allow me to examine relevant files in his possession without a waiver of attorney-client privilege. I received no response in attempting to obtain the waiver from the Hualapai Tribal Council.

York the Seneca lost Cold Spring Longhouse, one of their most sacred sites, to the rising waters impounded by the controversial Kinzua Dam.⁴⁰

Even prior to the reaffirmation of tribal sovereignty by the United States Supreme Court, officials from the state of Arizona recognized the strong legal position held by the Hualapai Nation and dealt with it as a sovereign entity by agreeing to the contract of 1960—eighteen years prior to the pivotal *Wheeler* decision which reaffirmed the “unique and sovereign” status of Native American tribal governments.⁴¹ Federal officials also recognized the legitimacy of the Hualapai claims to the hydroelectric potential on this reach of the river after 1965. This exercise of legal agency on the part of the Hualapai predates landmark decisions in which other Native Americans defeated states in legal disputes concerning ancestral fishing rights and artifact repatriation. The documentary evidence available strongly suggests that the Navajo and Hualapai also learned from the experiences of the Sioux and Seneca Nations and insisted upon a definitive rate of compensation fixed in a contract prior to the initiation of construction. This suggests not only that federal and state officials recognized the increasingly powerful position Native groups now held in conflicts over resources, but that American Indians themselves were becoming more and more cognizant of the fact that they had succeeded in tipping the legal balance in their favor.

Second, the enormous annuity payments awarded the Hualapai Nation also greatly increased the likelihood that the high Bridge Canyon Dam proposal would fail. Stewart Udall viewed the high dam as the key to the entire project because its potential power output, the revenue it would accrue, and the water it would help divert from the Columbia River had obtained California’s support. California had managed to derail the original CAP proposals in 1950–1951, and Udall was determined to include enough benefits in his regional plan to assure California’s backing. With California’s support assured, however, Udall was blindsided by another obstacle: the opposition of Washington Senator Henry Jackson, who stridently opposed both the high dam and the proposed diversion from the Columbia River. Jackson had the power to stop the project in its tracks because he was the chair of the vital Senate Interior Committee. Although lowering the height of the dam would have been difficult, Udall had discussed this possibility with Jackson and the other parties involved. However, the Hualapai annuity cut so deeply into the revenue pool that after 1965, when the Interior Department agreed to pay it, a compromise involving a low dam became an impossibility. Thus the Hualapai annuity, by eliminating the possibility of compromise and forcing CAP supporters to cling to the high dam, helped lead to the deletion of the Grand Canyon dams from the proposal altogether—a fortuitous circumstance for environmentalists opposed to the project.

⁴⁰ See Peter Iverson, “We Are Still Here,” *American Indians in the Twentieth Century* (Wheeling, IL, 1998), 131–2, for overviews of these and other land-use controversies.

⁴¹ White, *It’s Your Misfortune*, 580–1.

This controversy also sheds some light on how Native Americans and environmental organizations are perceived by the American public and portrayed in the historical record. Many environmentalists argue that American Indians have an ecological consciousness that white society needs to emulate to assuage the environmental depredations that American industrial capitalism has wrought upon the landscape for much of the twentieth century. Historians have also engaged in this debate, with scholars ranging from Calvin Martin to Shepard Krech arguing the issue of Native Americans as environmentalists.⁴² Ironically, at the very time when Iron Eyes Cody appeared on national television and through his tears admonished the American public to respect rather than destroy the natural world, both the Hualapai and Navajo Nations were seeking to construct hydroelectric dams in Grand Canyon, perhaps the most spectacular example of a natural environment to grace the North American continent. While the CAP debate is only one act in a much larger drama, it illuminates the difficulties that can arise when scholars attempt to lump all American Indians into one ecologically conscious camp. Furthermore, it also suggests that by doing so, historians have failed to recognize the agency American Indians have exercised in determining the use of their resources, even though in wielding it, Native Americans may undermine popular stereotypes of themselves as proto-environmentalists.

Finally, the campaign to gain Native American support and manipulate public opinion is illustrative of the Machiavellian tactics Central Arizona Project proponents and environmentalists used during the Grand Canyon dam controversy. The CAP supporters promised enormous economic benefits to the Hualapai Nation for much of the debate. Yet they revealed their true colors as political pragmatists when, faced with Carl Hayden's and Stewart Udall's impending retirements in January 1969, they abandoned the Hualapai Nation after it became politically expedient to delete the dams in February 1967. Their lofty pronouncements about aiding the Hualapai Nation notwithstanding, the Department of the Interior and Arizona state and federal officials instead left the Hualapai people with heightened expectations about economic advancement that never came to pass.

Additionally, although environmentalists enlisted the Navajo Nation in their opposition to the Grand Canyon dams and argued that scenic tourism to Marble Canyon would constitute an important source of revenue, the Navajo Rim remains relatively unpublicized and undeveloped. And in perhaps the supreme irony of the campaign, the Sierra Club emerged as the leading activist environmental organization in the United States after the controversy ended, a reputation greatly enhanced by public perceptions of the club's having saved Grand Canyon. Yet by courting the

⁴² Many historians have entered the debate over whether Native Americans were the first "environmentalists." Two prominent and controversial examples are Calvin Martin, *Keepers of the Game: Indian-Animal Relationships and the Fur Trade* (Berkeley, 1978) and Shepard Krech III, *The Ecological Indian: Myth and History* (New York, 1999).

Navajo Nation and obtaining its opposition to the dams in support of coal-fired power plants, the Sierra Club became a party to large-scale environmental devastation. Peabody Coal Company has destroyed vast stretches of Navajo country by strip-mining for coal, and the air pollution from the Four Corners and Navajo power plants now frequently obscures the view across Grand Canyon, the very place the Sierra Club fought so stridently to preserve. In the end, both supporters and opponents of the Grand Canyon dams failed to anticipate the environmental and human consequences of their actions and compromised their idealistic rhetoric by choosing pragmatic, politically expedient solutions when the chips were down.

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